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Abs t ract
This paper Is an attempt to explain the observed patterns of quality
specialization in LDC markets. Empirical evidence suggests that higher
qualities are produced by more capital-intensive firms and low and seemingly
inefficient qualities often persist in markets where labor-intensive firms
dominate. It is argued that these phenomena are not easily reconcilable
with the assumptions of perfect markets, but may be explained in the context
of competitive markets with asymmetric information. Capital-intensive firms
are likely to have a cost disadvantage in LDCs, but they can compete with
labor-intensive firms in the markets for higher quality products because
they can better dispel the seller moral hazard problem that exists in
markets where product quality is valuable but not fully observable by buyers
at the time of purchase. In this situation, regulation of entry to high
quality markets may help the more efficient labor-intensive firms become
active in this range as well. Support for labor-intensive firms at the
entry stage may have an adverse impact upon the range of qualities supplied
by such firms.

I. Introduction
In many less developed countries (LDCs), consumers Identify high quality
goods with Imports or with the products of modern capital-intensive firms.
Indigenous labor-intensive firms, on the other hand, are often perceived to
be suppliers of low quality products. Such perceptions have been recently
confirmed by a number of studies that find a direct relationship between
product quality and the capital intensity of production technology In a
variety of markets (see, for example, Little, Mazumdar, and Page, 1987;
Suri, 1988a; Rashid, 1988)." These observations have raised intriguing
theoretical questions concerning the reasons behind such a pattern of
quality specialization and its efficiency. Moreover, since poor quality
seems to have been an important problem in the local as well as the export
and import-competing markets of LDCs, the above observations have also
called into question the soundness of a number of popular policies in LDCs
that are aimed at promoting small enterprises as a vehicle of industrial
3development
.
A usual explanation for the above pattern of quality specialization
among firms is that capital-intensive techniques have a natural cost advan-
tage in producing high quality products (see, for example, Little et al.,
1987). However, in cases such as adulterated milk, which is a widespread
problem in many LDC markets dominated by small traditional producers
(Rashid, 1988), the labor-intensive technology can hardly be seen as an
immediate cause of low quality. Yet another well-documented example is that
of laundry soap in India where the low quality supplied by labor-intensive
producers is largely a matter of the nature of ingredients used rather than
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the type of the production technology employed: low quality soap Is found
to contain large amounts of "fillers" that have no detergency value and only
add to the size and weight of soap bars (Suri, 1988b). Also, one wonders
why the technological factors that give capital-intensive firms cost advan-
tage in the production of higher qualities do not also help them in the pro-
duction of lower qualities as well (Mazumdar, 1988). Finally, it is not
quite clear why technological factors should give capital-intensive firms
a similar competitive edge in the production of higher qualities across so
many different products.
In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation for the observed
pattern of quality specialization based on a moral hazard model of quality
determination. The basic argument is as follows. Quality is often a func-
tion of a number of product characteristics that buyers can fully observe
only after use. As a result, when the costs of production increase with
quality, there is a seller moral hazard in the market for higher qualities.
Since for most products it is extremely costly to design and enforce
complete contracts, institutions such as reputation must arise to overcome
this moral hazard problem. A seller who provides low quality In the name of
high quality is considered dishonest and, consequently, boycotted. Of
course, for this type of buyer behavior to be effective in preventing dis-
honesty, sellers must expect long-term profits in their current businesses
in excess of the benefits of cheating and whatever they expect to earn in
alternative occupations. Since the benefits of cheating increase with the
quality demanded, sellers of higher qualities must earn higher premiums to
remain honest. However, in competitive markets, potential entry constrains
the profits that a seller can expect to earn and, therefore, limits the
range of qualities that can be supplied in equilibrium. Thus, one suspects
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that the higher Che sunk costs of entry, ceteris paribus
,
the higher the
quality that the market can sustain. Since one associates high sunk costs
with capital-intensive production technology, one expects higher qualities
to be feasible only when more capital-intensive firms dominate the market.
When labor-intensive firms have a cost advantage over the capital-intensive
ones, as is the case in LDCs where labor is relatively cheap, they success-
fully compete and dominate the markets for low qualities. However, in
markets for high qualities, capital-intensive firms whose costs are more
sunk than recurrent may have a "moral hazard" advantage and, thus, capture
the market even if they have a cost disadvantage.
The above arguments imply that when capital-intensive technologies are
unavailable or too costly, the market may be dominated by labor-intensive
firms that supply low qualities even though they can produce high qualities
at affordable costs. This implication of our model explains the puzzling
observation of clearly inefficient qualities in many seemingly competitive
LDC markets. As Rashid (1988) observes, the prevalence of low quality in
some markets, such as diluted milk in the milk market, cannot possibly
be explained by consumer preferences. As he forcefully argues, it is dif-
ficult to believe that any consumer would want to buy diluted milk while he
can add water to pure milk himself; the cleanliness of the process would be
more certain and the cost may even be lower. A similar argument applies to
the "filled" laundry soap mentioned above and pebble-blended rice observed
by Akerlof (1970). Our explanation of such phenomena is based on the lack
of exogenous, nonsalvageable entry costs in the case of cost-effective
labor-intensive technologies and the costliness of alternative capital-
intensive ones.
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It Is interesting to note that historically, many products produced
under craft guild systems by means of labor-intensive technologies did not
suffer from quality problems. In most of these cases, the product quality
of labor-intensive firms deteriorated only after the guilds lost their
control over the market (Kuran, 1988). In light of the model developed in
this paper, the success of the traditional guilds in controlling product
quality can be explained by their ability to restrict entry and output. The
guilds achieved these goals through methods that impeded technological and
organizational innovation (Thrupp, 1971). Nowadays, capital-intensive
technology serves a similar purpose as a guarantor of product quality with-
out being as restrictive as the guild system.
The simple model developed in this paper to formally demonstrate the
above arguments is In some basic respects similar to those of Klein and
Leffler (1981) and Allen (1984). It is an infinite horizon model where
risk-neutral sellers and buyers live forever. Sellers are endowed with
twice-dif f erent iable cost functions that depend on the quality as well as
the quantity of their products. At the beginning of each period, each
seller chooses the quality and the quantity that he wants to produce and
announces a price and a quality. Buyers observe the prices and the sellers'
claims about marketed qualities and then decide where to shop. At the end
of the period, buyers realize the true qualities of the products they have
purchased. If a seller markets a quality below what he announces, buyers
consider him dishonest and boycott him in the future. A seller who markets
a quality equal to or higher than what he announces maintains his reputation
for honesty and has the opportunity to continue participating in the market
in the following period.
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Beyond the above basic assumptions, our model differs from that of Allen
quite sharply. Allen assumes a long-terra precoramitraent to price on the part
of sellers. This assumption makes it possible for competitive equilibria to
exist for all qualities as long as entrants have to bear a positive non-
salvageable cost and buyers can directly or indirectly observe the volume of
each firm's sales. In such equilibria, sellers produce at inefficiently
small scales, but do not cut prices or expand output because these actions
make cheating more profitable, and buyers—who are aware of this relationship
—
would not buy their products. In the model developed in this paper, it is
shown that in the absence of price precoramitment and output observability
assumptions only a subset of the technologically feasible qualities may be
produced in equilibrium. This subset depends on the relative size of non-
salvageable entry costs and may reduce to the lowest possible quality if
such costs are negligible. We assume that the level of output produced by
each seller is not observable by buyers and that buyers choose where to shop
based on the announced prices and their beliefs about the qualities supplied
by various sellers. In this situation, there will not be any seller
rationing. Therefore, as in Klein and Leffler (1981), sellers choose their
output levels such that their profits are maximized.
Seller precommitment to price in Allen's model is a mechanism for recon-
ciling premia necessary for maintaining high quality with limited, exoge-
nously given, entry costs. In Klein and Leffler (1981), positive premia
and limited entry costs are reconciled by seller precommitment to the provi-
sion of "free" services that are valuable to buyers. This precommitment is
achieved by sellers investing in nonsalvageable assets that render those
services. However, as Allen (1984) points out, for most industries such
services are either not feasible or have the nature of public goods and,
therefore, are unlikely to attract buyers to the firm providing them.
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In Esfahanl (1989), a game-theoretic model is developed where there Is
no seller precommi traent and endogenous entry costs arise as a result of
buyers' preference to continue purchasing from the same seller as long as
that seller does not cheat or make offers that are dominated by those of
other sellers. Given this buyer behavior, entrants have an incentive to
offer a strictly lower price than those of established sellers in order to
attract customers. In equilibrium, all sellers are indifferent between
cheating and maintaining their reputations. Entrants provide the high
quality with a smaller frequency so that buyers remain indifferent between
the offers of entrants and established sellers. Naturally, the solution of
the game is always in mixed strategies.
In the model developed in this paper, only pure strategies are allowed
and sunk entry costs, including all the necessary costs of initial setup and
information provision, are assumed to be entirely exogenous. Changing the
assumptions of the model and extending it to include endogenous entry costs
does not change the main results of the paper because in that case the moral
hazard disadvantage of labor-intensive firms simply translates into larger
premia necessary for high qualities when produced by such firms. This gives
capital-intensive firms an overall price advantage at higher ranges of
product quality and, again, leads to quality specialization according to the
type of technology.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
develop a basic model of price and quality determination in a market with
asymmetric information and with one type of production technology. In
Section III, we examine the equilibrium of such a market when a range of
technologies Is available. Finally, in Section IV we conclude the paper
with a brief summary.
-7-
1 1 . *i Model of Reputation and Product Quality
In Competitive Markets
Consider a seller who has to choose the quality, q e [q n ,°°], and quan-
tity, x e [0,»], of his product based on a cost function c(q,x) with partial
derivatives c > 0, c > 0, c > 0, and c > 0, for all q and x, and with
q ' x xx qx ^ '
the Inada conditions lira c (q,x) = °°, for all x, and lira ^.cCq.x) = andq*co x n x+0 n *
8 9
lira ^cCq.x) = °°, for all q. q
n
is the rainiraum feasible quality. Suppose
that in a given period the seller believes that if he announces quality q
and price p, he can attract as many customer's as he wishes. We assume that
buyers cannot observe the level of output and, therefore, can only respond
to the announced price and quality. Define iv(p,q,x) = px - c(q,x) as the
one-period profits of the seller. Note that if p > lira _c (q,0), ther v r
— x+0 x ^ ' '
profit-maximizing level of output, x*(p,q), is determined by p = c (q,x*).
Let ir*(p,q) = ir(p,q,x*). Since there are no recurrent fixed costs, ir*(p,q)
_> 0. If p <_ lira _c (q,x), it will not be worthwhile to produce quality q
at all and, therefore, x*(p,q) = and ir*(p,q) = 0. In particular, if p <_
lira .c (q_,x) = p ft , no quality will be produced at p and ir*(p,q) = for
x*0 x r
all q. It is easy to see that when it* is positive, it is increasing in p
and decreasing in q. For later use, let us define q(p) as the minimum
quality that satisfies 7r*(p,q) = for p > pn . Obviously, p
=
lira _c (q(p),x). Note that for each price p > p~ , the production of allX+0 X f r t-Qt f
qualities lower than q(p) yields positive profits.
For expositional purposes, suppose the seller announces a pair (p,q) at
the beginning of the period. If the seller markets a quality equal to or
greater than q, his reputation will be maintained. That is, in the follow-
ing period buyers will be willing to consider his offer of high quality.
Suppose that in this case the discounted present value of his profits in all
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future periods is V. If, on the other hand, the seller markets a quality
less than q, he will be considered dishonest and will be boycotted, in which
case he will earn zero profits in all future periods. This is the maximum
credible punishment that buyers can apply. Note that if the seller chooses
the first strategy, he does best by supplying quality q, whereas if he
chooses the second strategy he does best by supplying q_. Therefore, the
second strategy will not dominate the first one if
(1) y(p,q,V) = TT*(p,q) + -j~ - TT*(p,q ) > 0,
where r > is the rate of interest. It is assumed that if the seller is
indifferent between the two strategies, he will choose the first one. We
will refer to (1) as the seller moral hazard condition. As long as p and q
satisfy (1), buyers can be confident that the seller will not cheat In his
current offer. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that if (1) holds
for an offer (p,q), buyers will believe that the seller who makes that offer
will deliver the claimed quality with certainty, while if (1) is violated by
(p,q), buyers will believe that the seller will cheat with certainty. It is
easy to see that these are in fact rational equilibrium beliefs.
Once buyers have formed their beliefs about the qualities offered, they
compare the offers of all sellers and choose the one that provides them with
the highest utility. If they are indifferent among a number of sellers,
they will choose one of them randomly. This type of buyer behavior allows
perfect competition among sellers and brings about a unique equilibrium
price for each quality in the market. To simplify the exposition, we assume
that different buyers have different tastes for quality with a sufficiently
wide range so that any feasible quality has a potential buyer.
-9-
Our goal in the rest of this section is to find the set of (p,q) pairs
that can be offered in a stationary competitive equilibrium of the model
when sunk entry costs are S > 0. Note that in the long-run equilibrium we
must have V = S, unless there has been excessive entry in the past in which
case V < S and V is determined by the relative numbers of buyers and sellers
in the market as well as the shapes of the cost and demand functions. Since
excessive entry in most LDC markets is likely to be a temporary phenomenon,
in the rest of this paper we concentrate on the case where V = S and entrants
expect zero profits. This helps us avoid the specification of a particular
demand function and considerably simplifies our analysis and exposition.
From (1) it is easy to see that for V = S > and for sufficiently small
p, the moral hazard condition is satisfied regardless of q since in this
case TT*(p,q
n
) is either zero or close to zero. In fact, this is true for
all p _< p (S), where p (S) is the smooth and increasing function implicitly
defined by
(2) 1r*(p
m(S),q ) = ^
When p > p (S), "* ( p , q ) > S/(l+r) and (1) may hold only if q is small
enough for n*(p,q) to become positive and sufficiently large. The following
lemma shows that for p > p (S) and S > 0, y(p,q,S) = has a unique solu-
tion, q*(p,S), which is a continuous function, decreasing in p and increas-
ing in S.
Lemma 1 . For S > and p > p (S), y(p,q,S) = has a unique solution
q = q*(p,S). q*(p,S) is continuous in p and S, with q* < and q* > 0.
P s
Proof . First, note that p
m
(S) > p . Thus, q(p) > q for all p > p
m
(S).
Moreover, y(p,qQ ,S) > and y(p,q,S) < for all q >_ q(p). Therefore, since
-10-
y is a continuous function of q, y(p,q,S) = must have a solution, q* ,
restricted to the open interval (q~,q(p)). However, in this interval y is
strictly increasing in q since y = c > 0. Hence, q* must be unique,
bounded, and continuous in p and S. Finally, differentiation of y(p,q*,S) =
with respect to p and S yields
a „*
x*(p,q*) - x*(p,q )
O) |a* = j-jr-^—9- < odp c (q*,x*)
and
( I \ Ai*. - l n n^ ; 3S (l+r)c (q*,x*) U *
q
The sign of (3) follows from the fact that x*(p,q*) < x*(p,q ). Q.E.D.
As shown in Figure 1, the graph of q*(p,S) against p starts at p (S),
slopes downward, and tends toward q = q . The vertical line at p = p (S)
and q*(p,S) jointly define a boundary to the left of which the moral hazard
condition is always satisfied. We will refer to this boundary as the moral
hazard curve (MHC) . The downward slope of MHC may seem counterintuitive
since often higher prices are associated with greater incentives to produce
higher qualities. However, it should be noted that it is higher prices in
future that play such a role. The current price, on the other hand, has an
adverse effect on quality since it increases the benefits of low quality
production for which the optimal output level is larger. The impact of
future prices is captured by V. Note that if V = S increases, MHC shifts to
the right and the set of (p,q) offers that buyers can reliably accept from
sellers expands.
Among the price-quality offers that satisfy the moral hazard condition,
only those that render nonpositive, discounted, expected profits for poten-
tial entrants can prevail in a competitive market equilibrium. Therefore,
-li-
tre must have iT*(p,q) + V/(l+r) - S _< 0. Again, ruling out the case of
excessive entry and setting V = S , we find the following zero profit con-
dition for entrants
(5) n*(p,q) - 3^ S = 0.
Let p
Z (S) be the price level at which TT*(p,qQ )
= rS/(l+r). Note that p
Z
(S)
z z
is a continuous and increasing function of S and p (S) > p„ . For p < p (S),
iT*(p,q) < rS/(l+r) regardless of q. Therefore, ir*(p,q) = rS/(l+r) can hold
only for p ^> p
Z (S). Let q(p,S) be the solution of Ti*(p,q) - rS/(l + r) for
p _> p (S). We will refer to q(p,S) as the zero profit curve (ZPC).
Obviously, q(p,S) is a continuous function which is increasing in p and
decreasing in S. Figure 1 shows the graph of q(p,S) against p. As shown in
this figure and proven in Proposition 1 below, q(p,S) intersects q*(p,S)
ID Z
only once to the right of both p = p (S) and p = p (S). The curve segment
AB of the ZPC that lies below the MHC represents the set of equilibrium
offers. Note that sellers who offer higher qualities charge higher prices,
but all sellers make the same profits. No individual seller has an incen-
tive to deviate from this set of equilibrium offers because offering a
quality lower than q(p,S) at price p leads to a total loss of customers,
while offering a quality higher than q(p,S) reduces current profits.
Proposition 1 . For S > 0, the equation q(p,S) = q*(p,S) has a unique solu-
tion, p*(S). p*(S) > p
m
(S) and p*(S) > p
Z (S). Moreover, for p < p*(S),
q(p,S) < q*(p,S).
Proof . At the intersection of q(p,S) and q*(p,S) we must have y(p,q,S) =
**(p,q) ~ rS/Cl+r) = 0, which implies
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(6) **(p>q ) = S > 0.
Since n*(p,q ) is equal Co zero when p = p~ and is strictly increasing in p
>^ pn without bound, equation (6) always has a unique solution. The solu-
tion, p*(S), must be greater than p (S) since n*[p (S),q ] = S/(l+r) < S =
1T*(p*,q
Q
). Similarly, p* > p
Z (S) since n* [ p
Z
( S) ,qQ ]
- rS/(l+r) < S =
**(p*>q ). Finally, since for p < p*(S), n*(p,q ) < S = n* [ p,q(p,S) ] +
S/(l+r), we must have y[ p,q( p,S) ,S] > 0, which implies q(p,S) < q*(p,S).
Q.E.D.
In equilibrium, buyers face the price-quality pairs represented by the
curve segment AB in Figure 1 and choose the one they prefer most.
Naturally, buyers with stronger tastes for quality choose higher points on
M
AB. However, q (S) = q(p*,S) is the highest quality available in the market
and buyers will not be able to find qualities above q (S) at any price
regardless of their tastes for quality. Note that as S + 0, p*(S) + p~
and q' (S) + q~ . That is, when the market becomes perfectly "contestable,"
no quality higher than the minimum one, qn , can exist in equilibrium.
Therefore, the presence of positive sunk entry costs is necessary for the
existence of a market for higher quality products.
Note that as S increases, both MHC and ZPC shift to the right (see
Figure 2), and the maximum price in the market increases. But the maximum
quality may increase or decrease depending on the relative movements of the
M
two curves. If the MHC shifts more than the ZPC, then q rises, while if the
M
ZPC shifts more than the MHC, q declines. The reason for this ambiguity is
rooted in the fact that while an increase in S raises the benefits of main-
taining reputation and tends to support higher qualities in the market, at
the same time it increases the benefits of cheating by raising the current
-13-
price. The latter effect may outweigh the former only If at price p* the
optimal scale of production is significantly larger when quality q~ , rather
than q'
,
is produced. This point can be analyzed more formally by examining
M
the derivative of q with respect to S:
m dq' _ x*(p*,q ) _ rK
' dS x*(p*,q
Q
) 1+r
Note that when S is small, x*(p*,q ) is close to x*(p*,q
n
) since q is close
M
to q~. Therefore, according to (7), for the sufficiently small S, dq /dS is
always positive since r/(l+r) < 1. However, for larger S's, it is possible
that x*(p*,q' ) may be ouch smaller than x*(p*,q
n )
and result in dq' /dS < 0.
This possibility can be ruled out if the derivative of dq /dS with respect
to S always remains positive. It is easy to show that a sufficient condi-
2 M 2
tion for d q /dS > is
(8) <WV X* (P*'V 1 > IT? Scx 1 ^' if? **<P*.V ] -
Condition (8) is likely to hold if r is relatively small and c (q,x) does
not increase too sharply with q or decline too rapidly with x. In light of
M
this observation, cases in which q increases with S seem more plausible and
will be the focus of our analysis in the rest of this paper.
The above results provide an explanation for the puzzling persistence of
quality problems in many LDC markets with a multiplicity of small, labor-
intensive producers. Such firms are likely to have relatively small sunk
costs and find it easy to enter the market, especially when buyers and
sellers are numerous and their relationships are impersonal. Historically,
many societies had overcome this problem through their traditional guild
systems, which restricted entry, kept profits high, and made quality main-
tenance feasible. However, with the disintegration of the guild system
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in modern times, increased competition squeezed profits and eroded the
incentives of labor-intensive firms to produce high quality products.
The above results also may explain why quality problems tend to wither
away as markets become more concentrated under modern, capital-intensive
firms (Rashid, 1988). Such firms have relatively large sunk costs and,
thus, are more likely to sustain higher qualities when they manage to domi-
nate the market.
In the following section, we explore the conditions under which capital-
intensive firms can compete with the labor-intensive ones at different ranges
of product quality.
III. Quality Specialization and Production Technology
in Competitive LDC Markets
In this section we employ the model developed above to examine the rela-
tionship between a firm's technology and its product quality in a market
where more than one type of technology is available. The type of each
firm's technology Is assumed to be common knowledge. Suppose that there is
a family of technologies indexed by b e [b_,b] with associated sunk cost,
S(b), and recurrent cost, c(q,x;b), such that S, > and c, < 0. In the
context of our model, labor-intensive technologies are associated with low
b's and capital-intensive technologies with high b's. In order to capture
the cost disadvantage of capital-intensive firms in LDCs , we assume that for
the relevant range of q and x
< 9 > if- S. + c. > 0.1+r b b
We demonstrate that this assumption implies equilibrium specialization in
high qualities by capital-intensive firms and in low qualities by labor-
intensive firms. If, as claimed by some authors, more capital-intensive
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technologies have cost advantage In higher qualities, then our result will
only be strengthened.
The moral hazard and zero profit conditions for each technology
obviously depend on the parameter b of that technology. Assumption (9)
implies that the ZPC shifts down and to the right as b increases (see
Figure 2)
:
( 10 ) is. = ^ -b
+ °
b
< 0.KlV)
8b -c (q*,x*)
q
For the MHC, we have
3q *
-c
b
(q*,x*(p,q*);b) + c
b (q Q
,x*(p
,qQ )
; b) + j^ h(U)
3b c (q*,x*;b)
S
b
and 3p /3b = > 0. If r is substantially greater than 1 and
(l+r)x*(pm ,q )
Cu^Srv > x*(p >q rt ) »b) - c, (q* ,x*(p ,q*) ;b) is negative and large, then 3q*/3b mayb b
become negative, otherwise 3q*/3b > 0. Thus, in the more likely cases where
the rate of interest is not too high or capital-intensive technologies are
not strongly biased in favor of lower qualities, the MHC will shift up and
to the right as b increases.
Irrespective of the direction in which the MHC shifts, the price of the
maximum quality in the market, p* , increases with b since dp*/db =
[S + c (q x*(p*,q );b)]/x*(p*,q ) > 0, which is obtained by differentiating
M(6) with respect to b. However, the maximum quality itself, q , may increase
or decrease according to the relative shifts of the MHC and ZPC. Differen-
Mtiation of q' = q(p*,S) = q*(p*,S) with respect to b and some rearrangement
results in
< 12
> a£ -•!£«-«>&
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where a = -r-> -
,
-
^
—:r~x~7T"~ • Obviously, < a < 1 since 3q/3p > and3q/3p-3q*/3p — —
M
3q*/3p < 0. Equation (12) shows that the change in q as a result of a
change in b is a weighted average of the shifts in q* and q, with the
weights depending on the relative slopes of the two curves. The first terra
M
on the right-hand side of (12) reflects the increase in q due to the gain
in the moral hazard advantage as b increases, while the second terra captures
M
the loss due to the cost disadvantage. Since 3q/3b < 0, q will rise with b
if 3q*/3b is positive and sufficiently large. Clearly, if the MHC shifts
down, q will decline.
M
Using (10) and (11) it is easy to show that dq /db > iff
S
b
+ c
b (q
,x*(p*,q
Q
);b) ^ S b + c b (q
M
,x*(p*
,q
M
) ; b)
'
x*(d* a ) MX
^
P
'V x*(p*,q )
MCondition (13) simply states that q will increase with b if the average
increase in the total cost of production is greater in case of cheating than
M
in case of honesty when quality q is being offered. Note that the per-
period fixed cost in case of cheating is S while in case of honesty it is
only rS/(l+r). Condition (13) is likely to hold if r is relatively small,
M M
c, (q- ,x*(p* ,q_) ; b) is not too small relative to c,(q ,x*(p*,q );b), or
M
x*(p*,q ) is not too large relative to x*(p*,q ).
Let us now consider the market equilibrium with two distinct technologies,
M M
b
1
and b~ , with b ? > b. . Let q. and q 9 respectively be the maximum quali-
ties that technologies b and b can support in equilibrium when each one is
M
the sole technology available. Depending on the relative values of q. and
M MM
q 9 , two situations can be distinguished. If q„ _< q. , as in Figure 2, then
capital-intensive firms will not produce in equilibrium, while labor-
intensive firms will supply the entire range of qualities between q_ and q. .
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The reason is that in this case every quality that b -type firms can offer
without a moral hazard problem can also be reliably supplied by b.-type
M M
firms at a lower price. If q~ > q, , as in Figure 3, then capital-intensive
M M
firms will produce at the range of qualities (q-,,q~], while labor-intensive
M
firms will dominate the [q ,q ] range as before. The reason for this pat-
tern of specialization is rather simple. In the [q.,q.] range, labor-
intensive firms have cost advantage and can make competitive offers without
M
any moral hazard problem. However, for qualities above q , the prices that
convince buyers about the quality of labor-intensive firms' products are too
low to make production by such firms profitable. Therefore, in this range,
capital-intensive firms can compete because of their moral hazard advantage,
and despite their cost disadvantage. This shows that in general either
capital-intensive firms do not produce at all or, if they do, they spe-
cialize in higher qualities, while labor-intensive firms produce lower
qualities. In equilibrium, capital-intensive firms can only produce at
M
those points on their ZPC that lie above q, but below their own MHC (see
Figure 3).
If capital-intensive technologies have cost advantage at high qualities,
as shown in Figure 4, their ZPC will be more vertical and their MHC will lie
above the MHC of labor-intensive firms. Therefore, the pattern of speciali-
zation will be reinforced. Note that if q^ is the quality at which the zero
profit curves of the two technologies cross, in equilibrium labor-intensive
firms produce only in the [q n ,q_] range, while capital-intensive firms pro-
Mduce in the [q-,,q~] range. The only case where there may be reverse spe-
cialization is when capital-intensive firms have cost advantage at lower
quality levels. However, in LDCs capital-intensive firms are likely to have
higher costs for the entire range of feasible qualities.
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By extending the above arguments, It Is easy to see that when more than
two technologies are present, each one will specialize In a different range
of qualities, with the range being higher the greater is the capital inten-
sity of the technology.
Note that if the government provides subsidies for labor-intensive firms
to enter the market, their fixed entry cost, S, declines and their zero
profit and moral hazard curves shift to the left. Thus, in the likely
situation where dq /dS > 0, such a policy reduces the range of qualities
produced by these firms. This outcome can be quite inefficient since a
range of desirable qualities may be either eliminated from the market or
produced by less efficient capital-intensive firms. In fact, in this situa-
tion, regulation of entry by both labor- and capital-intensive firms to the
high quality markets may be a means of supporting high quality production by
the more efficient labor-intensive firms.
In the last few decades, many LDC governments have started support
programs for small, labor-intensive enterprises. A popular genre of such
programs, sometimes called the "Indian model" (Kilby, forthcoming), empha-
sizes aid to small enterprises at the entry stage based on an infant-
industry-type argument. Little et al. (1987) and Kilby (forthcoming)
heavily criticize this aspect of the LDC small enterprise programs from an
12
adverse selection point view. The present model points to a further in-
efficiency that may follow from these programs as a result of moral hazard.
IV. Conclusion
The low quality of products observed in LDC markets is often attributed
to the preferences of low income consumers who consider quality to be a
luxury. This benign view of quality problems in less developed countries
has prevented economists from paying greater attention to low product
-19-
quality as a source of inefficiency and sluggish growth. In fact, upon
closer look one finds patterns and phenomena that are not easily explicable
by consumer preferences. In many local LDC markets, higher qualities seem
desirable but not always available (e.g. pure milk and clean rice) and in
export and import-competing markets, some LDC products lose customers
because of low quality, despite their low prices. In fact, in LDCs high
quality is often closely associated with the products imported from devel-
oped countries or produced by modern capital-intensive firms. If indeed
low quality is a reflection of market failures, then understanding its
causes and consequences may have profound Implications for all aspects of
industrial policy in LDCs. In particular, one needs to evaluate policies
towards export promotion, import substitution, technology transfer, and
small enterprises in light of the nature of the failures present in the
product as well as factor markets.
This paper is an attempt to show that many quality-related phenomena in
LDCs that are not easily reconcilable with the assumptions of perfect mar-
kets may be explained in the context of competitive markets with asymmetric
information. The model developed in this paper shows that in LDCs, capital-
intensive technologies are associated with higher qualities because firms
with such technologies can more easily dispel the seller moral hazard
problem that exists in markets where some product characteristics cannot be
observed before use. An important implication of this model is that the
current support policies in many LDCs for small, labor-intensive enterprises
at the start-up stage may in fact lower the range of qualities that such
firms produce and cause inefficiency. These policies are intended to help
solve various problems that inexperienced entreprenuers face in their input
and output markets. However, the inefficiency that such policies may
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generate In the product markets has to be weighed against their benefits in
other respects.
Our analysis shows that the markets for high quality products may bene-
fit from a regulation that makes it more costly for both labor-intensive and
capital-intensive firms to enter. This will reduce the seller moral hazard
problem of labor-intensive firms and allow them to compete with the more
costly capital-intensive firms. The traditional guild systems achieved this
goal in the past, but at the cost of prohibiting innovation and impeding
development. Modern regulation needs to be designed with greater care to
address the moral hazard and adverse selection problems with as little
repercussion for technological and organizational innovation as possible.
Of course, when such regulations are not feasible, capital-intensive tech-
nologies may be a quite economical means of solving product quality
problems, even though they may seem inappropriate for LDCs from a factor-
price point of view.
-21-
Notes
For an interesting discussion of consumer attitudes in LDCs towards
imports and products of firms with foreign technology see Bardhan and
Kletzer (1984).
2
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, e.g., certain handicrafts
and objets d'art. However, the rule seems to apply to many products that are
not primarily demanded for their artistic value.
3
For detailed descriptions and critiques of LDC policies toward small
enterprises, see Little, Mazumdar, and Page (1987), Little (1987), and Kilby
(forthcoming). Accounts of the problems faced by LDCs because of the poor
quality of their exports can be found in Morawetz (1981) and Chiang and
Masson (1988).
4Quality problems is some markets may persist if buyers are not fully
rational and follow advertising (Schmalensee , 1978) or market share
(Smallwood and Conlisk, 1979), rather than sellers incentives to provide
high quality. Also, some buyers may fall victim to dishonest sellers if
they remain uninformed about seller reputations (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977;
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Chan and Leland, 1982; Cooper and Ross, 1984;
Schwartz and Wilde, 1985). In such models, uninformed buyers take a risk
and avoid the cost of information gathering by trying to free ride on the
information gathered by others. While useful in other contexts, the assump-
tion of information asymmetry among buyers seems inappropriate for the pur-
pose of explaining quality problems in competitive markers.
In Allen's model, the equilibrium price is equal to average cost but
greater than marginal cost. Buyers choose among sellers randomly and, thus,
all sellers end up with the same number of customers. In equilibrium, the
number of firms in the market is such that the sales of each firm are just
sufficient to provide entrants with zero discounted long-term profits. How-
ever, established sellers earn sufficient premiums over their recurrent aver-
age costs to have the necessary incentives to provide high quality. The
assumption of seller precoramitment to price is crucial here because In its
absence a seller can claim that he is reducing his price and expanding his
output only for one period and will go back to the "equilibrium" path
thereafter. If buyers believe that such an equilibrium exists, it becomes
possible to deviate in this way without violating the seller moral hazard
condition, since it is only the future profits that provide the seller with
the necessary incentive to maintain his reputation. Therefore, the deviat-
ing strategy has the potential to make the seller as well as his customers
better off. Obviously, this possibility encourages deviation from the
equilibrium path in each period by every seller and ultimately upsets the
equilibrium.
6
Shapiro (1983) discusses an alternative mechanism for generating endo-
genous entry costs. He builds an "adaptive expectations" model In which
buyers expect entrants to offer low introductory prices while providing high
quality. Shapiro shows that the entry costs endogenously determined in this
way may be sufficient to maintain a high output price and, thus, support a
high quality equilibrium. However, if buyers are rational about the quality
of entrants' products, no equilibrium exists.
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Another endogenous entry barrier is analyzed by Farrell (1986). He
argues that if firms are large, entry by each single firm has a nonnegligible
impact on the market. In this case, entry with the promise of high product
quality may not be credible if buyers do not find switching sellers worth-
while or anticipate effective reactions by incumbents.
In the present model, there is no adverse selection problem and no sig-
nalling costs a la Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1986). However, the costs of information provision may include the neces-
sary signalling costs if adverse selection is present.
o
These Inada assumptions seem reasonable and are made to simplify the
analysis. They are not essential for the main results of the paper.
9
qo may alternatively be interpreted as the level of q below which
buyers can recognize the quality of the product at the time of purchase with
certainty.
For example, the buyer utility may be summarized by 8u(q) - p, where u
is continuous and increasing in q and 8 > is a parameter reflecting the
buyer taste for quality.
If somehow customers of a particular seller convincingly commit them-
selves to pay a high price for a high quality and ignore other sellers that
may offer the same quality at a lower price, they may be able to persuade
that seller to deliver qualities higher than q^. In fact, customers with a
large enough demand may manage to commit themselves to pay a high price
through binding contracts or vertical integration. However, in most markets
with a large number of buyers each one of whom buys a small amount, these
options require considerable cooperation, contract enforcement, and moni-
toring, which are likely to be too costly to be practical.
12
For a formal critique of the infant-industry argument from an adverse
selection point of view see Grossman and Horn (1988).
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